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COMMENTS
TIE BANKRUPT STUDENT-DEBTOR V. THE
EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION: THE STRUGGLE FOR
ACADEMIC TRANSCRIPTS UNDER CHAPTER 7 OF THE
BANKRUPTCY CODE
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most divisive issues that has surfaced in the law of
bankruptcy over the past fifteen years is whether an individual can
obtain an academic transcript after he or she files for bankruptcy.
Several colleges and universities refuse to release transcripts if a
student owes a debt and has not made arrangements to repay the
obligation.'
At first glance, the ability to obtain a transcript from an edu-
cational institution may appear to be a trivial issue. Yet, as illumi-
nated by recent case law, there are several important reasons why
one might need his or her transcript. The most obvious need is in
order to matriculate at a new school.2 If a student is forced to
1. See, e.g., CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW HANDBOOK 103
(1995) (stating that "students with outstanding debts to the University (emergency student
loans, tuition, and other fees) may not . . . obtain a transcript . . . until the indebtedness
has been cleared"); see also Darrell Dunham & Ronald A. Buch, Educational Debts Un-
der The Bankruptcy Code, 22 MEM. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 713 (1992) (noting that these
policies have been upheld against challenges that they violate the Fair Debt Collection
Practices Act).
2. See Stevens Inst. of Technology v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 759, 760
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (noting that if the debtor did not obtain her transcripts from
Stevens she would be forced to start as a first year student at her new university); Najafi
v. Cabrini College (In re Najafi), 154 B.R. 185, 188 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993) (stating that
the debtor needed transcripts released to his new college); In Re Dembek, 64 B.R. 745,
747 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (discussing how previous high school attended by debtor's
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matriculate without a transcript then he or she suffers the loss of
the academic standing gained at his or her previous educational
institution. Other less obvious reasons presented to the courts in-
clude obtaining United States citizenship3 and seeking employment,
including eligibility for civil service exams.4 A number of these
cases have been litigated and appealed, indicating the significance
of this issue.
This Comment addresses the case wherein a student-debtor has
filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy5 and alleges that an edu-
cational institution, by refusing to release his or her transcripts, has
violated the automatic stay provision,6 the fresh start provision,7 or
minor son would not release his transcript because of tuition owed, thereby preventing the
son from being promoted to senior standing and jeopardizing his eligibility to graduate
from his new high school).
3. See Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 739 (6th Cir.
1992) (stating that after filing for bankruptcy the debtor attempted to obtain a copy of her
transcript from the University in an effort to gain United States citizenship).
4. See Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163, 164 (3rd Cir. 1984) (stating
that the debtor complained that the inability to obtain his transcript was jeopardizing his
professional advancement); California State Univ., Fresno v. Gustafson (In re Gustafson),
111 B.R. 282, 284 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (stating that the debtor needed his transcript in
order to take a Civil Service Exam purportedly required by his employer), rev'd on other
grounds, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1991); Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Howren (In re Howren), 10 B.R. 303, 304 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (noting that the debtor
needed his transcript in order for his teaching application to be given proper consider-
ation).
5. Although this issue has arisen with respect to student-debtors who have filed for
bankruptcy under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code, all of the cases have found that an
educational institution could not withhold a transcript under this Chapter. See Virginia
Union Univ. v. Parham (In re Parham), 56 B.R. 531 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986); In Re
Reese, 38 B.R. 681 (Bankr. N.D. Geo. 1984); Lanford v. Macalester College (In re
Lanford), 10 B.R. 132 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1981); In Re Ware, 9 B.R. 24 (Bankr. W.D.
Miss. 1981); In Re Heath, 3 B.R. 351 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980). Further, courts addressing
this issue in the context of Chapter 7 refer to the distinction between Chapter 7 and 13
cases with approval and reject student-debtors' reliance on Chapter 13 case law. See, e.g.,
Johnson, 728 F.2d at 166; Najafi, 154 B.R. at 192.
6. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6) (1988). This section provides in pertinent part that the filing
of a bankruptcy petition operates as a stay of "any act to collect, assess, or recover a
claim against the debtor that arose before the commencement of the case .... .. Id.
Note that violations of this stay are punishable under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) which provides:
"An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section shall
recover actual damages, including costs and attorney fees, and, in appropriate circumstanc-
es, may recover punitive damages."
7. 11 U.S.C. § 525 (1988). This section makes it illegal to "for a governmental unit
to deny, revoke, suspend, or refuse to renew a license, permit, charter, franchise, or other
similar grant to, condition such a grant to, discriminate with respect to such a grant
against . . . a debtor under this title .... " Id. The courts have consistently held that a
transcript qualifies as an "other similar grant." Although this section does not use the
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both. Through a discussion of two recent exemplary cases, Part II
of this Comment examines the reasoning used to support a ruling
for the student-debtor. Part III considers the initial case law that
held for the educational institution, including an analysis of a third
"middle-of-the-road" trend that has emerged in the last five years.
Both of these sections illustrate the confused and unpredictable
nature of the various courts' rulings. Part IV analyzes the various
courts' rationale. Ultimately, this Comment recognizes that this
issue should be interpreted in light of the fundamental purpose of
the Bankruptcy Code: to provide the debtor with a fresh start while
assuring creditors equal treatment.' Thus, this Comment proposes a
legislative mandate requiring that upon payment of reasonable
administrative costs by the student-debtor, an educational institution
must release his or her transcript if the request is made before the
loan is declared nondischargeable.9
I. THE TREND IN FAVOR OF THE STUDENT-DEBTOR
As previously stated, a student may challenge the denial of a
transcript under the fresh start and/or automatic stay provisions of
the Bankruptcy Code. In order to take advantage of the automatic
stay provision, however, the student must allege the violation be-
fore a determination of dischargeability as the automatic stay is
normally lifted at "the time a discharge is granted or denied."'"
phrase "fresh start", commentators have referred to § 525 by this name because the sec-
tion was passed to ensure debtors were not deprived of a "fresh start" as a result of
government discrimination. Elizabeth A. Bronheim, Interpreting Section 525(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, 7 BANKR. DEV. J. 595, 595 (1990).
8. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95 Cong., 1st Sess. 125 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6086.
9. When an individual files for bankruptcy, certain debts are discharged. A discharge
protects the debtor from any further personal liability on discharged debts. In Chapter 7,
debts that are incurred prior to the order for relief and which do not fall within any of
the exceptions will be discharged. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a) (1988). Prior to 1978, educational
loans were typically discharged. Dunham & Buch, supra note 1, at 680. However, be-
cause of the increasing number of students who resort to bankruptcy to cancel their edu-
cational debts, an exception to the discharge rule was created for educational loans. Id.
Under § 523(a)(8), educational loans made by governmental or non-profit entities are
listed as an exception to discharge. See id. at 682-86 (discussing the primary sources of
educational loans). Note that if the debt is more than seven years old this exception does
not apply. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A) (1988). The question of whether a loan meets the
requirements of § 523(a)(8) has proven to be a hotly litigated issue. See, e.g., Dunham &
Buch, supra note 1, at 695-702 (discussing the various tests courts have developed to
determine if the elements of § 523(a)(8) have been met).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)(2)(C) (1988). This section states: "the stay of any other
act . . . continues until the earliest of (A) the time the case is closed; (B) the time the
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Similarly, the use of the fresh start provision is limited as it pre-
vents discrimination only by governmental units." Thus, a stu-
dent-debtor can allege a violation of this provision only where the
educational institution is public. The relief provided for a violation
of either section is the same: a court order requiring the education-
al institution to release the transcript. Initially, there was unanimity
in favor of student-debtors in the case law. The various courts
reached their pro-debtor holdings by endorsing a broad reading of
these Bankruptcy Code provisions. Although recently some
courts have held for the educational institution, 3 the following
cases illustrate that the student-debtor may still successfully obtain
his or her transcript.
A. Finding a Violation of the Fresh Start Provision
A student-debtor may allege that there has been a violation of
the fresh start provision if the educational institution is public. For
example, in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
Howren4 the student-debtor owed $7896.00 to the University of
Alabama and, as a result, the University withheld his transcript."
The University admitted that its sole purpose in doing so was to
compel payment of the debt.' The court began by discussing the
legislative history of the fresh start provision and noted that its
purpose is to protect debtors from discriminatory treatment. 7 Rec-
ognizing that the list of activities expressly enumerated in the fresh
start provision is not exclusive, the court stated that any action that
seriously impairs the debtor's livelihood and "fresh start" is prohib-
ited." Thus, the court held that once bankruptcy proceedings were
case is dismissed; or (C) if the case is a case under Chapter 7 of this title concerning an
individual . . . the time a discharge is granted or denied." Id.
11. See supra note 7.
12. See infra notes 14-36 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 37-72 and accompanying text.
14. 10 B.R. 303 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980).
15. Id. The student-debtor responded by filing the motion currently before the court,
requesting the court to order the immediate release of his transcript. Id. at 304. He had
recently applied for a teaching position, and needed to submit the transcript to his poten-
tial future employer before his application would be considered. Id.
16. Id. at 304.
17. Id. The court stated that the fresh start provision "prohibits state discrimination
against debtors in a manner inconsistent with bankruptcy policy and is designed to pre-
vent governmental units from frustrating the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code."
Id.
18. Id. The court cited the legislative history of the fresh start provision to support its
conclusions. Id.
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initiated, the act of withholding a debtor's transcript for the sole
purpose of compelling him to pay a prepetition debt violated the
fresh start provision.19
B. Finding a Violation of the Automatic Stay Provision
One of the most recent cases holding for the student-debtor,
California State University, Fresno v. Gustafson," is illustrative of
the analysis used to find that the failure of an educational institu-
tion to turn over a transcript violates the automatic stay provi-
sion' In this case, the student-debtor filed for Chapter 7 relief on
May 2, 1986.' The University was listed as a creditor based on
an unpaid National Direct Student Loan obligation.'a On July 11,
1986, prior to receiving a discharge, the student-debtor requested
the release of his transcript from the University.24 The University
refused to release the transcript and insisted that notice of a dis-
charge must first be received.' A few days later, the debtor again
asked that his transcripts be released, stating that he needed them
immediately in order to take a civil service examination required
by his employer. The University again refused.' On September
11, 1986, the debtor filed an action against the University.27 The
bankruptcy court concluded that the University's actions violated
the automatic stay provision and granted sanctions against the
University." The University filed an appeal.
The appellate court began its analysis by determining that the
19. Id. at 305.
20. 111 B.R. 282, 284 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 934 F.2d 216
(9th Cit. 1991).
21. Id. at 286. See also Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738
(6th Cir. 1992) (withholding a transcript violates the automatic stay provision); In Re
Dembek, 64 B.R. 745, 749-50 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1986) (stating that the coercive tactic of
withholding a transcript "was the precise ill the Congress desired to remedy").
22. Gustafson, 111 B.R. at 284.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. California State Univ., Fresno v. Gustafson (In re Gustafson), 111 B.R. 282, 284
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1991). The Uni-
versity official who responded to the debtor's request stated in a letter that "[t]he only
way I would release your transcripts before I receive the 'Discharge from the Bankruptcy
Court' would be for you to reaffirm your National Direct Student Loan with us." Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. The lower court found that at the time the University denied the plaintiff's
request, it was aware of his Chapter 7 case. Although it found that the university's ac-
tions were not malicious, it awarded the debtor attorney's fees. Id.
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automatic stay provision applies to debts that are presumed to be,
but have not yet been determined, nondischargeable.29 The court
based its holding on the fact that the automatic stay is one of the
most fundamental debtor protections provided by the Bankruptcy
Code.3" Thus, the court reasoned that if the stay provision is
found to be inapplicable to presumptively nondischargeable debts,
then that fundamental protection would be lost even though the
debt may eventually be declared dischargeable by reason of a valid
defense." The court also recognized that the stay provision lists
exceptions and concluded that because educational loans are not
excepted but other nondischargeable debts are, Congress must have
intended that the collection of educational loans be subject to the
automatic stay.32 Yet, the court did hold that once the educational
loan obligation is determined to be nondischargeable by the bank-
ruptcy court, the automatic stay provision no longer precludes
efforts to collect.3
3
The court also rejected the University's argument that with-
holding the transcript is not an act to collect the debt in violation
of the automatic stay, stating that "[w]itholding of the transcript
could serve no purpose other than to compel the repayment of the
debt or reaffirmation of the obligation."34 Significantly, the court
held that an affirmative action is not required to violate the stay,
concluding that a refusal to take affirmative action can constitute
an act to collect a claim.35 Finally, the court also noted in support
29. Id. at 285.
30. Id. at 286.
31. California State Univ., Fresno v. Gustafson (In re Gustafson), IlII B.R. 282, 286
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1991). The court
offered time bar and hardship defenses as examples of when a presumptively
nondischargeable loan may be declared dischargeable. Id.
32. Id.; see also Andrews Univ. v. Merchant (In re Merchant), 958 F.2d 738, 741 (6th
Cir. 1992) (noting that although the educational loans are presumptively nondischargeable,
they are not listed in the exceptions to the automatic stay provision and therefore, the
University was in violation of the automatic stay).
33. Gustafson, III B.R. at 286. The court stated that "[tihe requirement of a judgment
of nondischargeability assures that the debtor is protected from any attempt to collect dis-
chargeable debts during the breathing space afforded by the automatic stay by virtue of
the fact that the court has considered nondischargeability and decided in favor of the
creditor." Id.
34. Id. at 286-87. The court also noted that were it to decide that withholding the
transcript was not a violation of the automatic stay, the protection afforded to a Chapter 7
debtor under the automatic stay provision would be inferior to that afforded a Chapter 13
debtor, a distinction not support by the language of the provision. Id.
35. Id.; see also Lanford v. Macalester College (In re Lanford), 10 B.R. 132, 134
(Bankr. Miss. 3rd Div. 1981) (stating that refusing access to the transcript "is no less
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of its decision that forcing the University to relinquish the tran-
script does not affect the University's right or its ability to collect
the debt were it to survive discharge. 6
II. THE TREND IN FAVOR OF THE EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION
A. Finding No Violation of the Fresh Start Provision
Johnson v. Edinboro State College was the first major case to
hold for the educational institution.37 The court accomplished this
result by adopting a more restrictive view of the Code provisions.
In Johnson, the debtor graduated from college in 1974 and later
filed a Chapter 7 petition for bankruptcy, which was granted in
1981.38 The debtor owed the college $1700.00. After his petition
was granted, he filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court claiming
that the debt was dischargeable, and that the college refused him
access to his transcript.39 The bankruptcy court found that the
loans were nondischargeable, yet required the college to turn over
the transcript because withholding it violated the fresh start provi-
sion of the Code.' The college filed a motion for reconsideration
with respect to the transcript, but the district court affirmed the
bankruptcy court.41
On appeal, the Third Circuit reversed the judgment of the
district court. The Third Circuit based its decision on the fact that
the debtor's student loan was nondischargeable.42 The court began
its analysis with the fresh start provision and noted that while
providing a debtor with a "fresh start" is one of the key policies
under the Code, at times that policy may conflict with other poli-
cies enunciated by Congress.43 For example, the court explained
that the legislative history and text of the Bankruptcy Code indi-
cate that Congress wanted educational loans to be
nondischargeable. Emphasizing that congressional judgments bind
coercive than the action of a creditor in badgering and harassing a debtor into paying a
discharged debt").
36. California State Univ., Fresno v. Gustafson (In re Gustafson), 111 B.R. 282, 288
(Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1991).
37. 728 F.2d 163 (3rd Cir. 1984).
38. Id. at 164.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Johnson v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163, 166 (3rd Cir. 1984).
43. Id. at 164.
963
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all courts, the court concluded that when a debtor has educational
loans, Congress has made "it that much more difficult for a debtor
to put the past behind."'
The court next considered the specific legislative history of the
fresh start provision, and found that it was intended to codify the
result reached by the United States Supreme Court in Perez v.
Campbell.4' Because Perez dealt with a loan that had been dis-
charged, the Johnson court concluded that the fresh start provision
was intended to protect only those debtors with dischargeable
loans.' Thus, the court held: "we can find no basis in the Bank-
ruptcy Code to nullify [the College's] policy of withholding tran-
scripts from those students who have made no payments on their
educational loans, have not approached the college to arrange a
more flexible repayment schedule, and have not had their debts
discharged."'47 The holding in Johnson is qualified to the extent
that the Third Circuit suggests that if some portion of the debt
were paid or if a payment schedule were agreed upon, then the
denial of a transcript would constitute a violation of the fresh start
provision.'
B. Finding No Violation of the Automatic Stay
This holding in Johnson was endorsed and expanded nearly
ten years later in Najafi v. Cabrini College.49 In Najafi, the debtor
decided to apply to a new college." However, when he requested
44. Id.
45. 402 U.S. 637 (1971). In this case, the court held that a state could not refuse to
renew a driver's license because of a discharged tort judgment without violating the fresh
start provision. Id. at 639.
46. Johnson, 728 F.2d at 165. The court noted that the legislative history of the fresh
start provision indicated that Congress intended to codify the result in Perez v. Campbell.
Id.
47. Id. at 166.
48. Id.
49. 154 B.R. 185 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993).
50. Id. at 188. The debtor's history with Cabrini College was unique and needs to be
explained. His eventual readmission to the school was not done according to the school's
normal admission process and thus served as the basis for the court's reduction of the
amount owed to the school. See infra note 56. From 1986 to 1991, the debtor attended
Cabrini as both a full-time and part-time student. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 188. He withdrew
in 1991 because of poor grades. However, his luck turned in August, 1991, when he won
$100,000 playing blackjack at a casino. Id. He stated that he intended to use the money
to help the homeless, and the press that covered the story reported that he was a student
at Cabrini. Id. This resulted in "extensive favorable publicity in the media." Id. As a
result, Cabrini once again accepted him as a full-time student, despite his past history and
the fact that he submitted his application approximately one week before classes were to
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his transcript from Cabrini, the school refused to release it until his
tuition bill was paid in full." In December, 1992, the debtor filed
for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. 2 After filing, he reiterated his request
to Cabrini to release his transcript and Cabrini once again re-
fused. 3 The debtor filed a complaint alleging that Cabrini's ac-
tions violated the automatic stay provision 4
The court began its analysis by determining that the debtor's
student loans were nondischargeable.55 The court then addressed
the transcript issue. Before considering the facts of the case before
it, the court made two preliminary assertions. First, the court stated
that the - same considerations are involved in determining whether
refusing to provide a transcript violates the fresh start or the auto-
matic stay provisions. 6 It based its assertion partially on the fact
that whenever a violation of both sections was alleged, the courts
consistently rule that both or neither of the Code sections are vio-
lated. Further, the court also based its assertion on the fact that
prior courts considering a violation of the automatic stay in this
context often discuss prior case law in which student-debtors only
alleged a violation of the fresh start provision
Second, the court concluded that whether a debt had been
determined nondischargeable prior to a request for a transcript was
begin. Id. He had paid no tuition, contrary to the school's stated policy. Id. By Novem-
ber, 1991 he was severely in debt and left school. Id.
51. Najaf, 154 B.R. at 188.
52. Id. at 187.
53. Id. at 188.
54. Id. One week later, the student-debtor filed a complaint to have the loan from
Cabrini declared dischargeable and it was in that adversarial proceeding that the court
addressed the transcript issue. Id.
55. Id. at 190. However, there was also a debate as to the amount of the outstanding
debt. Cabrini's tuition for one semester was $4430. Id. Yet, the student-debtor only at-
tended classes for two weeks before becoming ill, and he attended no classes after that
point. Id. Because he did not officially withdraw, Cabrini held him liable for the entire
semester's tuition. Id. at 191. The court held that this was inequitable and concluded that
the debt should only be for $750.00. Id. at 190. The court supported its disregard of the
school's stated policy by noting that Cabrini did not adhere to its normal policies in
accepting the debtor. Id. at 191.
56. Najafi v. Cabrini College (In re Najafi), 154 B.R. 185, 193 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The
bankruptcy court stated that it was bound to follow the precedent set forth in Johnson.
See supra notes 37-48, and accompanying text. The debtor argued that because the John-
son court only addressed the fresh start provision, the case is distinguishable, and that
therefore the Johnson rationale is not controlling on this court. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 193.
This argument was rejected. Id.
57. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 193.
58. Id.
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not a significant factor.59 The court noted that if an educational
institution were only required to release a transcript if the debt in
question had been declared nondischargeable or the student conced-
ed that it was nondischargeable, the holding of cases like Johnson
would be greatly weakened, if not totally nullified.' The court
also stressed that because the automatic stay becomes effective
automatically and immediately upon a bankruptcy filing, "a savvy
student-debtor would always be able to succeed in requiring a
college to relinquish its transcripts, at least until a determination of
nondischargeability is made."'"
The Najafi court went on to consider the facts of the specific
case. It began by explaining that Cabrini had a policy of not sup-
plying a transcript where there is an outstanding tuition bill.62 In
denying the student-debtor his transcript again after he filed for
bankruptcy, the court found that Cabrini was reiterating, but not
escalating, its collection activity.63 Because the automatic stay pro-
vision operates to prevent a creditor from taking further post-peti-
tion collection activities, rather than requiring it to undo pre-peti-
tion collection activities, the court stated that it is illogical to find
Cabrini's actions to be a violation of the automatic stay.' Thus,
the court concluded that Cabrini's communication of its policy did
not violate the automatic stay.6
Although this reasoning was enough to support a finding for
Cabrini, the court undertook an unprecedented analysis of the re-
spective property rights in the transcripts of the student-debtor.'
59. Id. The debtor in this case offered this as another basis for arguing that this court
was not bound by the precedent set in Johnson. He argued that because Johnson con-
cemed a debt which had been determined to be nondischargeable prior to the transcript
issue being raised, it is distinguishable as the dischargeability of the debt in the present
case was in issue until the time of this decision.
60. Id.
61. Id. The student-debtor would just have to make sure not to concede
nondischargeability and make sure to get his or her transcript request in before a determi-
nation of nondischargeability is made.
62. Najafi v. Cabrini College (In re Najafi), 154 B.R. 185, 194 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1993).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 193-94 (emphasis added).
65. Id. at 195. See also California State Univ., Fresno v. Gustafson (In re Gustafson),
111 B.R. 282, 289 (Bankr. App. 1990) (Russell, J., dissenting), rev'd on other grounds,
934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1991).
66. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 194. It appears that the court engaged in this analysis because
the student-debtor's motion, in the alternative, presented a request "for a turnover of the
transcripts on appropriate conditions." Id. at 195. See also infra note 68 (suggesting that
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Because the transcripts are "recordations of the fruits of his labor,"
the court held that the student-debtor does have certain property
rights in them which fall within the scope of the "property of the
estate" of the debtor.' Yet, the court also found that the college
had a "special interest" in the transcripts of its students "which is
comparable to, if not legally the equivalent of, a security interest to
protect the college for losses in engaging in its normal undertaking
to supply the transcripts to third parties upon request." '6
The court then adopted the position that when a debtor seeks
the return of property which the creditor has on the basis of a pre-
petition security interest, the debtor must provide the creditor "ade-
quate protection" as a condition for the return of that property.69
It concluded that the payment of $300.00 would serve as adequate
protection, and that once Cabrini received the money it should
provide the transcripts." The court chose this figure because it
was adequate to cover Cabrini's administrative expenses in supply-
ing the transcripts and because it constituted a substantial satisfac-
tion of the student-debtor's obligation to Cabrini.7'
at least some indirect analysis has been done with respect to property rights in tran-
scripts).
67. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 194. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (1988).
68. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 194. Although no court has ever analyzed the respective prop-
erty rights in the transcripts, the concept of the educational institution having a protected
property interest was implicitly rejected in In Re Heath, 3 B.R. 351, 353 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1980), when the court stated that the transcript had no intrinsic value to the university.
The court went on to note that "[tihis finding obviates the need to explore the impact of
sections 362 and 525 on a creditor's conduct when the creditor withholds property for the
purpose of protecting a valuable property interest which the creditor possesses in the
specific property." Id. at n.2. In addition, the idea that the educational institution has a
security interest in the transcript has been rejected. In Board of Trustees of the Univ. of
Ala. v. Howren (In re Howren), 10 B.R. 303, 305 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980), the university
asserted that it had a security interest in the debtor's transcript. This court soundly reject-
ed this argument because it found that a transcript, unlike collateral in which a creditor
ordinarily takes a security interest, has no intrinsic value to the university. Id. Therefore,
the court held that withholding it was not equivalent to withholding property for the
purpose of protecting a property interest. Id. See also Parraway v. Andrews Univ. (In re
Parraway), 50 B.R. 316, 317-19 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1984) (stating that a security interest
only arises under Article 9 where the parties intend that the property shall serve as collat-
eral and that college transcripts are not the sort of property used as commercial security
under the Uniform Commercial Code).
69. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 194. The court acknowledged the existence of decisions that
found a violation of the automatic stay where a secured creditor retained property post-
petition which he or she acquired pre-petition. However, the court stated that these deci-
sions did not focus on the adequate protection requirement, and therefore concluded that
requiring the debtor to provide adequate protection to the creditor was sound. Id.
70. Id. at 195.
71. Id.
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C. The "Middle-of-the-Road" Trend
The reasoning of the Najafi court was endorsed in Joyner v.
Stevens Institute of Technology.2 Although this case was decided
by the same court as Najafi, it is important to consider because it
illustrates a deviation in the court's reasoning which indicates that
this issue is really being decided on a case-by-case basis. In
Joyner, Stevens initiated the action, seeking a determination that
the student's indebtedness of $10,456.24 was nondischargeable.'3
The student-debtor responded by asking the court to declare the
loan was dischargeable and requiring Stevens to release her tran-
script.74
The court first found that the loan was nondischargeable.75 It
then held, in accordance with the precedent set in Johnson, that the
debtor was not entitled to her transcript when her student loan debt
had not been declared dischargeable. 6 Yet, consistent with Najafi,
it also recognized that if the creditor were provided with adequate
protection, the transcript should be released.' What is striking
about this opinion is that the court adopted the same $300.00 fig-
ure, despite the fact that the student-debtor in this case owed over
$10,000.00. 78
As was previously stated, one of the major reasons why the
court adopted the $300.00 figure in Najafi is that it represented a
substantial payment of the outstanding debt. Indeed the Joyner
court acknowledged this fact but provided five "compelling factors"
which it felt justified using the $300.00 figure.79 First, Stevens
conceded that $300.00 greatly exceeded its administrative expenses
involved in providing a transcript."0 Second, when the debtor and
her family had been financially able, they had paid a considerable
amount of the money owed to Stevens from her first two years.'
Thus, the court stated that withholding her transcript for the years
72. 171 B.R. 759 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994).
73. Id. at 759.
74. Id. at 760. The court did not state under what Code provisions the debtor sought
relief. Id.
75. Id. at 761.
76. Id.
77. Joyner v. Stevens Inst. of Technology (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 759, 761 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1994).
78. Id. at 760-61.
79. Id.
80. Id. Stevens testified that the cost to the school is estimated to be only $5.00. Id.
81. Id.
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in which she made payment would be inequitable. 2 Third, the
court emphasized the student-debtor's inability to pay any more
money at the present time." Fourth, the court stated that if the
debtor were to finish her education, she would be more likely to
pay her remaining debt to Stevens in the next decade. 4 Receipt of
her transcript would greatly enhance the repayment process because
it would allow her to get credit for her completed years at
Stevens.85 Finally, the court stated that its holding was narrow so
as not to prevent abuse.86
IV. ANALYSIS
As indicated by the current state of the case law, the result of
a transcript case is unpredictable. A student's ability to get his or
her transcript may depend on the stage of the bankruptcy proceed-
ings, whether or not the educational institution in question has a
set policy of denying access to transcripts when there are outstand-
ing obligations and whether or not the educational institution is
public or private. In addition, the outcome may vary depending on
the jurisdiction and specifically on whether the court considering
the motion subscribes to the "adequate protection" theory that has
surfaced in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.
A. Is Withholding a Transcript a Violation of the Automatic
Stay?
As has been illustrated, the case law in this area is very mud-
dled. This confusion is partly because courts interpret the force of
82. Joyner v. Stevens Inst. of Technology (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 759, 761 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1994).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 762.
85. Id. The court stated that "[tihe investment in the Debtor's accelerated educational
progress through supplying her transcripts, which may save her over $20,000 in tuition at
Drexel, seems to us to be worthwhile to Stevens." Id. This reasoning was also noted by
the court in Gustafson. In stating that withholding a transcript is a violation of the auto-
matic stay provision, the court noted that: "withholding the debtor's transcript is arguably
counterproductive to the creditor's desire to be paid and the debtor's need to obtain the
additional training and/or employment necessary to enable the debtor to pay the presump-
tively nondischargeable student loan." California State Univ., Fresno v. Gustafson (In re
Gustafson), IIl B.R. 282, 286, n.3 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990), rev'd on other grounds, 934
F.2d 216 (9th Cir. 1991).
86. Joyner, 171 B.R. at 762. The court perceived its holding to be narrow because it
only permitted the debtor to obtain her transcripts for the sole purpose of enrolling at
Drexel University. Id.
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the automatic stay provision differently. The broadness with which
a particular court may interpret the stay depends on how it views
the policy implications behind its application. While the purpose of
the stay is to protect the debtor, a fundamental policy behind the
code is to provide relief to creditors. Thus, courts have the oppor-
tunity to be result-oriented and will typically find a violation of the
stay if it perceives that a debtor needs protection, especially if the
creditor's rights are not impaired. 7 Similarly, if the court per-
ceives that applying the stay may injure a creditor's ability to get
paid, it may apply the stay more narrowly and find no violation."8
Currently, the only aspect of the stay violation that appears to
be undisputed is that withholding a transcript does constitute an
"act" which may violate the automatic stay. Yet, other factors have
led the courts to varying results. The first component that may
alter a court's decision is whether the loan has been declared
nondischargeable. This classification is important as it concerns
whether or not the automatic stay is applicable to the actions of
the educational institution. 9 For some courts dischargeability is a
significant factor; they require an official finding of
nondischargeability in order to hold that retaining the transcript is
not a violation of the automatic stay.' ° Thus, these decisions ren-
der the presumption of nondischargeability inapplicable to the tran-
script issue. At least one other court, Najafi v. Cabrini College, has
attacked this distinction as being illogical, claiming that to draw
that line always gives the student-debtor a "window of opportunity"
to obtain his or her transcript and thus effectively affords full relief
to the debtor.9
The rationale of the cases which apply the automatic stay to
presumptively nondischargeable debts is persuasive as there is a
chance that the nondischargeable debt may be discharged if the
87. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (noting that one of the justifications the
Gustafson court offered in ruling for the student-debtor was that the creditor's tights to
collect the debt were not impaired).
88. See, e.g., Gustafson, 111 B.R. at 290 (Russell, J., dissenting) (noting that if the
University is forced to turn over the transcript "it has lost").
89. See supra note 10 and accompanying text (explaining the correlation between a
discharge determinations and the automatic stay).
90. See, e.g., supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text (discussing the Gustafson deci-
sion).
91. Najafi v. Cabrini College (In re Najafi), 154 B.R. 185, 193, n.3 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1993).
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debtor effectively raises a defense.' Further, the basis of the
Najafi court's holding is weak. The court stated that it was not in
a position to ignore the necessary implications of the Johnson
decision and could not "discount [its] precedential shad-
ow . ' It is clear, therefore, that the Najafi court postulated
that the result in Johnson was binding and required a holding in
favor of the educational institution. Yet, the student-debtor in
Najafi correctly argued that the two cases are distinguishable as
they addressed different provisions of the Code. Although the
Najafi court accurately noted that a holding for the student-debtor
would "render Johhison a complete nullity or at least greatly weak-
en its effect,"94 the Bankruptcy Code does not support its exten-
sion of the Johnson rationale. The purpose of the automatic stay is
to preclude creditors from taking any action to collect debts until
the bankruptcy court rules as to their dischargeability.95 The Najafi
court correctly stated that "[t]he time of a determination of
dischargeability can therefore never precede the timing of the effec-
tiveness of the automatic stay."'  Thus, because the Bankruptcy
Code creates the window, ignoring the fact that distinction between
presumptively nondischargeable and nondischargeable debts is not
justified.
Further, the fundamental purposes behind the Bankruptcy Code
seriously undermine the basis of the Najafi court's decision. The
Najafi court should have considered the policy implications of
ruling in favor of the educational institution. The uniqueness of a
student-debtor's need to obtain his or her transcript must be recog-
nized because the debtor cannot obtain it from any other source.
Thus, because proof of education has proven to be essential for
employment success and/or educational advancement, the right to
obtain it is necessary for the debtor to get a fresh start. Further,
because the loans are nondischargeable, the debtor must ultimately
repay them, so there is no threat that the creditor will receive
unequal treatment.97
The second factor that may affect a court's decision is
92. See supra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
93. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 193.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 6 (giving text of automatic stay provision).
96. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 193.
97. See supra notes 84-85 (noting that if the transcript is turned over the creditor will
have a better chance of getting paid).
19951
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
whether the educational institution has an official policy not to
supply transcripts where there is an outstanding obligation. To date,
only the Najafi court has explicitly considered an alleged automatic
stay violation in this context and ruled for the educational institu-
tion.98 Part of the basis for its decision and for its critique of ear-
lier cases ruling for the student-debtor was its finding that where
the school's policy is to withhold the transcript, merely restating
that policy is not enough to violate the automatic stay." Thus, it
appears that if the Najafi court were considering a scenario where
a school had no such policy, the court would be compelled to hold
that the school had violated the automatic stay.
In addition, the distinction drawn by the Najafi court is nar-
row as it is very fact-specific. The basis the court gave for the
distinction is that a creditor does not have to undo collection activ-
ities taken prepetition.Ir In Najafi, the student-debtor had request-
ed his transcript before filing for bankruptcy and Cabrini refused to
release it."° Presumably, where the student-debtor did not request
a transcript before declaring bankruptcy, the court's reasoning
should not apply." 2 Even if the educational institution had a poli-
cy of denying transcripts, having an official policy is not the same
as having an affirmative collection activity in place prepetition.
More importantly, the Najafi court's holding on this issue once
again disregards the unique policy arguments which support hold-
ing for the student-debtor.
Finally, none of the courts recognize that even though the
automatic stay may prevent an educational institution from with-
holding a transcript, the Bankruptcy Code does provide that a
98. See also California State Univ., Fresno v. Gustafson (In re Gustafson), 111 B.R.
289 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1990) (Russell, J., dissenting) (opining that a university should not
be required to turn over a transcript), rev'd on other grounds, 934 F.2d 216 (9th Cir.
1991).
99. Najafi, 154 B.R. at 193-94.
100. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text (explaining that the university was
not taking further collection activities but merely reiterating its past collection activities).
101. See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text (describing the sequence of events in
Najafi).
102. It is important to note that in its analysis, the court uses very broad language,
implying that it would hold there was no violation of the stay provision even if the debt-
or was not denied his request before filing for bankruptcy. The court states: "[i]f a col-
lege has determined, pre-petition, not to supply a transcript at the request of a student-
debtor, it is not clear why merely reiterating, but not escalating, that collection activity
post-petition should constitute a violation of the automatic stay." Najafi, 154 B.R. at 193-
94.
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creditor may get the stay lifted for cause.' Thus, in an extreme
situation an educational institution may be successful in withhold-
ing the student-debtor's transcript. However, if the creditor cannot
establish cause, until a finding of nondischargeability is made,
withholding a transcript should be held to be a violation of the
automatic stay.
B. Is There A Violation of the Fresh Start Provision?
The courts also appear to be divided over whether withholding
a transcript violates the fresh start provision. °4 This inquiry pres-
ents two relevant issues. The first is whether or not the student-
debtor can utilize the protection offered by the fresh start provi-
sion. Once again, the stage of the discharge proceeding is a factor
for some courts. If a loan has been declared dischargeable, all of
the courts would hold that the student-debtor could allege a viola-
tion of this provision. However, the courts disagree when the loan
has not been discharged. As illustrated by the Howren case, some
courts hold that the fresh start provision governs where the debt is
presumptively nondischargeable.05 Yet, the Johnson court held
that the student-debtor could not seek the protection of the fresh
start provision where a loan has been declared nondischarge-
able.'
These cases are distinguishable because Johnson expressly
conditioned its holding on the fact that the loan was not dis-
charged."° One can only speculate as to what the Howren court
would have held had the loan it was considering been declared
nondischargeable or what the Johnson court would have held had
103. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1988). This section provides in pertinent part: "[oin request of
a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall grant relief from the
stay . . . such as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay . . . for
cause .... " Id.
104. See Bronheim, supra note 7, at 599 (noting that the conflicting statements in the
legislative history of § 525 has led to courts reaching diverse holdings when deciding
discrimination cases).
105. See Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Howren (In re Howren), 10 B.R.
303, 304 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (stating that the legislative history supports that view);
see also In Re Heath, 3 B.R. 351, 353 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980) ("The proscriptions of
section 525 are applicable to discriminatory actions prompted by a debtor's recourse to
the protection of the Bankruptcy laws regardless of whether the debtor has obtained a dis-
charge.").
106. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
107. The holding in Johnson was expressly conditioned on the fact that there were no
payments made on the educational loan, no payment plan in place and no discharge of
the debts. See supra notes 37-48 and accompanying text.
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the loan it was considering been only presumptively
nondischargeable. However, given the fact that the courts have
been result-oriented in this area, one could presume that these two
courts and those that subscribe to their respective reasoning would
hold the same way even if the issue were presented at a different
stage of the discharge proceeding."' s Consistent with the reason-
ing regarding the automatic stay, the student-debtor should be able
to seek the protection of the fresh start provision at least until the
loan is determined nondischargeable as there is always the chance
that he or she will be able to raise an effective defense.
The second issue concerns whether the fresh start provision
has been violated. Even if a court were to endorse the proposition
that a debtor can seek protection under the fresh start provision
after a finding of nondischargeability, the debtor will not necessari-
ly be successful. When the loan is nondischargeable and the educa-
tional institution has a policy of withholding transcripts, it is diffi-
cult to assert that there is a violation of the fresh start provision.
In that scenario, the school is merely treating the bankrupt's ac-
count as it would any other. Thus, the fresh start provision should
not be implicated as its purpose is to protect debtors from discrimi-
nation based solely on the basis of bankruptcy." 9 Conversely, if
the educational institution has no policy, then denial of the tran-
script just because a student has filed bankruptcy would violate the
fresh start provision.
C. Critique of the "Middle-of-the-Road" Trend
Even if a court follows the reasoning that supports a ruling in
favor of the educational institution, the Najafi and Joyner decisions
illustrate that the student-debtor may ultimately prevail. Thus, al-
though the court in Joyner argues that its holding is narrow, it
arguably brings the line of cases dealing with transcripts full circle
because the reasons offered by the court to support its decision are
broad enough to fit almost any factual situation. "' It is difficult
to believe that an educational institution would require $300.00 to
108. There are other indications that this would be the result. First, the Johnson court
explicitly stated that it declined to subscribe to the reasoning espoused in Howren. John-
son v. Edinboro State College, 728 F.2d 163, 166, n.5 (3rd Cir. 1984). Second, the Najafi
court has already greatly expanded the holding of Johnson and would likely do the same
if presented with this issue. See supra notes 91-96 and accompanying text.
109. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 366-67 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6321-22.
110. See supra notes 79-86 and accompanying text.
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cover the administrative expenses of providing a transcript. In
addition, as the debtors in this dilemma have all filed bankruptcy,
it can be presumed that most would be unlikely to be able to pay
the debt at the present time. For any debtor requesting a transcript,
it goes without saying that having the transcript will facilitate addi-
tional education or training and may result in having the money to
pay the presumptively nondischargeable debt."' The only reason
that the Joyner court offers that may not be broadly applied is the
fact that the student-debtor in that case had made efforts in the
past to pay outstanding obligations to the university."2 Yet, the
lack of this one factor should not be enough to prevent a student-
debtor from obtaining a transcript.
Further, although some courts may require the payment of
money to protect the educational institution's "special interest," a
student-debtor should successfully be able to argue that the $300.00
figure currently advocated by the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
is arbitrary. Both of the reasons enunciated by the court in Najafi
when setting the $300.00 figure were eroded by the same court in
Joyner. Thus, it appears that a student-debtor should be able to
argue that the payment of actual administrative expenses is enough
to obtain his or her transcript.
IV. CONCLUSION
One might object to the idea of allowing a student-debtor to
obtain his or her transcript when bankruptcy has been declared
because it seems like a critique of the policy of withholding tran-
scripts in general. Indeed, one could argue that whether or not the
student-debtor has filed for relief under the Bankruptcy Code, it
seems counterproductive for an educational institution to withhold
its best chance of getting paid. Yet, the situation in bankruptcy can
be distinguished in two ways: (1) outside of bankruptcy it is not
necessarily true that the debtor cannot pay the school and thus
withholding a transcript may be the best way to compel payment;
and (2) denying a student who has filed for bankruptcy his or her
transcript not only quashes the educational institution's best chance
of getting paid, but may also affect the debtor's ability to pay
111. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
112. Note that in Johnson where the court ruled for the University, it noted that one of
the reasons it did not find a violation of the fresh start provision was because there had
been no attempt to repay the loans. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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other creditors. Therefore, having a different rule when bankruptcy
has been declared is justifiable."3
Further, the withholding of a transcript presents a unique
situation. Unlike other instances where the creditor holds an item
as collateral, a transcript has no inherent economic value to an
educational institution. Thus, it is clear that the educational institu-
tion is using the transcript solely as a lever. This should not be
permitted; the educational institution should rely on the discharge
proceedings to ensure the eventual satisfaction of the debt.
This area has proven to be surprisingly complicated and there
is a complete lack of uniformity amongst the various courts which
have considered this issue. It is even more disturbing when one
realizes that the result reached in a case may ultimately depend on
whether there has been a finding of dischargeability and whether
the school in question has a policy of denying transcripts. Further,
litigation is both costly and time-consuming, two luxuries which
the bankrupt cannot afford, especially in this context."4 Ultimate-
ly it appears that the best solution is for Congress to mandate that
prior to a finding of nondischargeability, upon payment of reason-
able administrative costs by the student-debtor, an educational
institution must release academic transcripts. Until that can be
accomplished, a student-debtor who is denied access to his or her
transcript prior to a finding of dischargeability should file a motion
claiming a violation of the automatic stay and, if the educational
institution is public, a violation of the fresh start provision as well.
ELEANOR N. METZGER
113. This is also not that dramatic of a proposal: some courts that have ruled for the
educational institution have limited their holdings by implying that were some schedule of
payments worked out or if some payment had been made, then the student should have
access to the transcript. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
114. The courts often recognize that the transcript issue needs to be decided immediate-
ly. See, e.g., Stevens Inst. of Technology v. Joyner (In re Joyner), 171 B.R. 759, 761
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1994) (stating that "[t]he determination of the Debtor's right to obtain a
transcript of her academic record at Stevens cannot be deferred, but must be decided
immediately if the Debtor is to be able to begin at Drexel beyond her first year in the
forthcoming term."); Board of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Howren (In re Howren),
10 B.R. 303, 304 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1980) (noting that the debtor filed the motion on
August 29, 1980 and needed his transcript by October 15, 1980 in order for his job
application to be considered).
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